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The Role of Trade Secrets in Innovation Policy 
Summary 
Many businesses have developed proprietary information that provides a competitive advantage 
because it is not known to others. As the United States continues its shift to a knowledge- and 
service-based economy, the strength and competitiveness of domestic firms increasingly depends 
upon their know-how and intangible assets. Trade secrets are the form of intellectual property that 
protects this sort of confidential information. 
Trade secret law protects secret, valuable business information from misappropriation by others. 
Subject matter ranging from marketing data to manufacturing know-how may be protected under 
the trade secret laws. Trade secret status is not limited to a fixed number of years, but endures so 
long as the information is valuable and maintained as a secret. A trade secret is misappropriated 
when it has been obtained through the abuse of a confidential relationship or improper means of 
acquisition. 
A number of competing innovation policy concerns help shape the particular doctrines that 
comprise trade secret law. The availability of legal protection for trade secrets potentially 
promotes innovation, encourages firms to invest in employee development, and confirms 
standards of commercial ethics and morality. On the other hand, trade secret protection involves 
the suppression of information, which may hinder competition and the proper functioning of the 
marketplace. An overly robust trade secret law also could restrain employee mobility and promote 
investment in costly, but socially inefficient security measures. 
Trade secrets are primarily a matter of state law. In 1996, Congress enacted the Economic 
Espionage Act (EEA), a statute that criminalizes both “economic espionage” and the “theft of 
trade secrets.” The EEA provides for substantial fines and imprisonment penalties, as well as 
criminal forfeiture of property and court orders preserving the confidentiality of trade secrets. 
Some commentators believe that few prosecutions have occurred under the EEA since its 
enactment and have deemed the legislation ineffective. 
Patents and trade secrets provide different intellectual property options for many new inventions. 
Inventors typically must choose (1) to maintain an invention as a trade secret, (2) to obtain a 
patent on the invention, or (3) allow the invention to enter the public domain. As a result, federal 
legislation or other developments that are perceived to alter the effectiveness of the patent system 
may make the trade secret more or less attractive to industry. 
Some commentators have encouraged Congress to supplement the EEA, which is a criminal 
statute, with civil federal trade secret legislation. They believe that this step would improve 
uniformity within the system. However, others believe that no compelling case has been made to 
federalize trade secret law. Other observers assert that the EEA should be amended to involve a 
private cause of action for economic espionage and trade secret misappropriation. 
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Introduction 
In recent years the Congress has shown considerable interest in promoting the strength and 
international competitiveness of U.S. industry. Several recent legislative proposals have 
concerned the intellectual property laws, a widely recognized mechanism for promoting 
innovation. In particular, several bills introduced in the 111th Congress address the topic of trade 
secrets. For example, both the Electronic Device Recycling R&D Act1 and the Motor Vehicle 
Owners Right to Repair Act of 20092 would allow firms to maintain confidential information as 
trade secrets. On the other hand, one recently enacted law arguably reduces the value of 
information that firms had retained as trade secrets. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act effectively allows manufacturers of follow-on biologics to rely upon the confidential clinical 
data generated by the product’s sponsors in order to sell competing products.3 In view of 
congressional interest in this form of intellectual property, an overview of trade secret law 
appears appropriate. 
The term “trade secret” generally refers to secret, commercially valuable information, including 
such subject matter as confidential formulae, techniques for manufacturing a product, and 
customer lists.4 Trade secret protection is largely a matter of state law.5 Under those laws, 
misappropriation of a trade secret may be enjoined by a court and the defendant may also be 
liable for compensatory and punitive damages.6 One notable federal statute, the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996,7 makes the theft or misappropriation of a trade secret a federal crime 
under certain circumstances. 
Trade secrets play a role in U.S. innovation policy. Trade secrets may establish incentives to 
innovate because they provide a mechanism for firms to capture the benefits of their inventions.8 
Yet trade secrets also have proven controversial because they suppress, rather than disclose, 
particular innovations to the public.9 They also may have a significant impact upon the mobility 
of highly trained employees between firms.10 Further, because innovators often face a mutually 
1
 H.R. 1580, § 3(f)(1). 
2
 H.R. 2057, § 3(d)(1). 
3
 P.L. 111-148, § 7002. 
4
 See Uniform Trade Secret Act, § 1. 
5
 See Michael Traynor and Katy Hutchinson, “Some Open Questions About Intellectual Property Remedies,” 14 Lewis 
6 Clark Law Review (2010), 453. 
6
 See Shubha Ghosh, “Open Borders, Intellectual Property & Federal Criminal Trade Secret Law,” 9 John Marshall 
Review of Intellectual Property Law (Fall 2009), 24. 
7
 104th Congress, P.L. 104-294 (Oct. 11, 1996). 
8
 See Michael Risch, “Trade Secret Law and Information Development Incentives,” in The Law and Theory of Trade 
Secrecy: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2010). 
9
 See Michael P. Simpson, “The Future of Innovation: Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and Protectionism—An Age-Old 
Tale,” 70 Brooklyn Law Review (2005), 1121. 
10
 See Charles Tait Graves, “Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and Consequences,” 15 Journal of Intellectual Property 
Law (2007), 39. 
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exclusive choice between patenting their inventions or maintaining them as trade secrets,11 
alterations to one of these regimes may alter the perceived attractiveness of the other.12 
This report provides an overview of the law and policy of trade secrets. It discusses the role of 
trade secrets in U.S. innovation policy. It then reviews the sources of trade secret law and the 
substantive rules that they provide. The report then provides a more detailed review of existing 
federal legislation that pertains to trade secrets. In its next section, the report then discusses the 
relationship between patent law and trade secret law. The report closes with an identification of 
congressional issues and options within this field. 
Trade Secrets and Innovation Policy 
Many businesses have developed proprietary information that provides a competitive advantage 
because it is not known to others.13 This category may include “high-tech” information such as 
chemical formulae, manufacturing techniques, product design, and technical data. But it may also 
include relatively “low-tech” information such as customer lists, business leads, marketing 
strategies, pricing schedules, and sales techniques.14 Potentially of additional competitive value is 
“negative know-how”: previously attempted, but flawed techniques or “blind alleys” that did not 
achieve their intended results.15 
As the United States continues its shift to a knowledge- and service-based economy, the economic 
strength and competitiveness of firms increasingly depend upon their know-how and intangible 
assets. Leonard I. Nakamura, Assistant Vice President and Economist of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia, explains that in the U.S economy over the past half-century, “mass 
production and tangible investment have become less important, while new products . . . and 
intangible investment have become more important.”16 One recent estimate placed the value of 
trade secrets owned by U.S. publicly traded companies at five trillion dollars.17 
Another way of measuring the increasing importance of intangible assets is by considering the 
value of the Standard & Poor’s 500. The “S&P 500” consists of the marketplace value of 500 
large publicly held companies.18 In 1975, 16.8% of the total value of the S&P 500 reportedly 
consisted of intangible assets. In 2005, intangible assets reportedly constituted 79.7% of the total 
11
 See Daniel C . Munson, “The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial Perspective,” 78 Journal of the Patent and 
Trademark Office Society (1996), 689. 
12
 See Douglas Lichtman, “How the Law Responds to Self-Help,” 1 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy (Winter 
2005), 215 (observing that trade secret law acts “as both a complement to and competitor for patent law.”). 
13
 See Kurt M . Saunders, “The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study,” 42 California Western Law Review 
(2006), 209. 
14
 Milton Babirak, Secrets of the Uniform Trade Secret Act, D . C . BAR C L E PROGRAM (Nov. 9, 2005). 
15
 Charles Tait Graves, “The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique,” 15 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 
(2007), 387. 
16
 Leonard I . Nakamura, Intangible Assets and National Income Accounting: Measuring a Scientific Revolution, 
Working Paper No. 09-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, at 3. 
17
 See Elizabeth A . Rowe, “Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets,” 17 George Mason Law Review 
(2009), 1. 
18
 See http://www.standardandpoors.com. 
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value of these firms.19 According to attorney R. Mark Halligan, “the vast bulk of intangible assets 
are trade secret assets.”20 
Yet the rise of computer technology, the ubiquity of cell phones and the Internet, and our 
transition to the Information Age have increased the difficulty that firms encounter in maintaining 
the confidentiality of their proprietary information. Years ago, the theft of trade secrets may have 
involved the taking of laboratory notebooks, memoranda, or other papers from a competitor’s 
office despite the presence of security personnel or surveillance cameras. Today, a trade secret 
misappropriator can download proprietary information from company computers, or take 
photographs of confidential documents using a cell phone camera, within moments. As attorney 
Victoria A. Cundiff concisely states: “The digital world is no friend to trade secrets.”21 
As U.S. firms become increasingly immersed in global competition, some observers believe that 
foreign firms and even foreign governments have devoted significant resources towards industrial 
espionage.22 According to the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “[t]he United 
States remains the prime target for foreign economic collection and industrial espionage by virtue 
of its global technological leadership and innovation.”23 These efforts have been linked not just to 
the economic competitiveness of the United States, but also to its national security.24 
The legal concept of trade secrets addresses these circumstances. Principles of trade secret law 
guard against the misappropriation of information that is not generally known. In view of the 
increasing prominence of information, it is unsurprising that Michael Risch, a member of the law 
faculty of the West Virginia University College of Law, asserts that trade secrets are “arguably the 
most important and most heavily litigated intellectual property right.”25 
Framing the trade secret law requires a balancing of competing interests. A robust trade secret law 
that provides strong protection to proprietary commercial information potentially holds many 
advantages. It may allow firms to capture the benefits of the costs and time it takes to develop the 
information, without having to share the benefits of that information with others. Trade secret law 
therefore may be seen as providing incentives to innovate.26 
Trade secret law may also encourage firms to invest in human capital. A firm is more likely to 
invest in employee development if it has some confidence that employee cannot immediately use 
19
 James E. Malackowski, “The Intellectual Property Marketplace: Past, Present and Future, 5 The John Marshall 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law (2006), 605. 
20
 R. Mark Halligan, “Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 
1996,” 7 John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law (2008), 656. 
21
 Victoria A. Cundiff, “Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets in a Digital Environment,” 49 IDEA: The 
Intellectual Property Law Review (2009), 359. 
22
 Susan W. Brenner and Anthony C. Crescenzi, “State-Sponsored Crime: The Futility of the Economic Espionage 
Act,” 28 Houston Journal of International Law (2006), 389. 
23
 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection 
and Industrial Espionage (2007), 1. 
24
 Aaron J. Burstein, “Trade Secrecy as an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking the Foundations of Economic 
Espionage,” 41 Arizona State Law Journal (2009), 933. 
25
 Michael Risch, “Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?,” 11 Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review (2007), 1. 
26
 Oren Bar-Gill, “Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms,” 157 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review (2009), 1649. 
Congressional Research Service 3 
The Role of Trade Secrets in Innovation Policy 
his knowledge in the service of a competitor.27 Firms may also establish a trade secret easily 
through self-help measures. Commercially valuable information is protected once a firm makes 
reasonable efforts to maintain it in confidence. There is no need for formal government 
involvement, in contrast to patents.28 
Trade secret law also confirms and regulates standards of commercial ethics and morality.29 The 
misappropriation doctrine applies only against wrongdoers—those who have breached a duty of 
confidence, engaged in espionage, or otherwise acted in bad faith.30 Trade secret law thus 
recognizes that even within a marketplace based open free competition, certain kinds of 
competitive behavior step beyond our social norms and should be discouraged.31 
On the other hand, trade secret laws potentially have negative aspects. First, although trade secret 
law may promote advancement, it might facilitate a particular kind of innovation—the 
development of information that is itself amenable to being kept secret.32 In addition, the 
protection of trade secrets necessarily requires firms to conceal their new developments. But as 
Judge Goldberg observed 40 years ago, “for our industrial competition to remain healthy there 
must be breathing room for observing a competing industrialist.”33 Thus, while some degree of 
information protection may be needed to promote innovation, some amount of information 
sharing may be essential for competition and proper functioning of the market.34 
As well, firms must expend resources to maintain information as a trade secret. Employees must 
sign confidentiality agreements, locks and safes must be installed, and electronic protection 
measures must be in place on computer systems. These measures entail time and expense.35 
Employers also may be encouraged to limit access to valuable information to select employees. 
Disclosing valuable trade secrets on a “need to know” basis to one’s employees may restrict 
employee development and ultimately hinder the operation of the firm.36 
Trade secret law may negatively impact employee mobility. Individuals who are unable to take 
their knowledge from job to job may be limited in their ability to change employers.37 As 
explained by Alan L. Durham, a member of the law faculty of the University of Alabama, an 
27
 Miles J. Feldman, “Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable Information: Trade Secrets and the Employment 
Relationship,” 9 High Technology Law Journal (1994), 151. 
28
 Lemley, supra, at 313. 
29
 See Elizabeth A. Rowe, “A Sociological Approach to Misappropriation,” 58 University of Kansas Law Review 
(2009), 1. 
30
 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research,” 97 Yale Law 
Journal (1987), 177. 
31
 See James Grimmelmann, “The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law,” 77 Fordham Law Review (2009), 2005. 
32
 Michael P. Simpson, “The Future of Innovation: Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and Protectionism—An Age-Old 
Tale,” 70 Brooklyn Law Review (2005), 1121. 
33
 E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). 
34
 Michael J. Garrison and John T. Wendt, “The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends 
and an Alternative Policy Approach,” 45 American Business Law Journal (2008), 107. 
35
 See Douglas Lichtman, “How the Law Responds to Self-Help,” 1 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy (2005), 215. 
36
 See Bruce Fallick et al., “Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Microfoundations of a 
High-Technology Cluster,” 88 The Review of Economics and Statistics (2006), 472. 
37
 See Bruce Alan Kugler, “Limiting Trade Secret Protection,” 22 Valparaiso University Law Review (1988), 725. 
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overly robust view of trade secret law potentially may “limit individual freedom, weaken 
employee bargaining power, and harm society through diminished competition.”38 
The various rules that together comprise the discipline of trade secret law may be fashioned in an 
effort to maximize the potential advantages of trade secrets while minimizing their disadvantages. 
This report next provides a more detailed review of the doctrines that regulate the acquisition and 
enforcement of trade secrets. 
An Overview of Trade Secret Law 
Basic Principles 
While it has been written that an “exact definition of a trade secret is not possible,”39 a trade 
secret generally consists of secret, commercially valuable information.40 As explained by Henry 
Perritt, Jr., a member of the faculty of the Chicago-Kent College of Law, “trade secret subject 
matter includes any of the major functions of business enterprise: production and operations, 
engineering and research and development, marketing, finance, purchasing, and management.”41 
Specific examples of trade secret subject matter include customer lists, manufacturing processes, 
marketing strategies, pricing information, product design, recipes, and sales techniques.42 One 
court has described trade secrets as follows: 
A trade secret is really just a piece of information (such as a customer list, or a method of 
production, or a secret formula for a soft drink) that the holder tries to keep secret by 
executing confidentiality agreements with employees and others and by hiding the 
information from outsiders by means of fences, safes, encryption, and other means of 
concealment, so that the only way the secret can be unmasked is by a breach of contract or a 
tort.43 
Whether information qualifies as a “trade secret” is a question of fact that may be determined by 
a jury. Among the factors in assessing whether certain subject matter is a trade secret are: 
• the extent to which the information is known outside of the company; 
• the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the 
company; 
• the extent of measures taken by the company to guard the secrecy of the 
information; 
• the value of the information to the company and to its competitors; 
Alan L. Durham, “Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement,” 93 Minnesota Law Review (2009), 933. 38 
39
 Restatement (First) of Torts § 757, comment b. 
40
 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4). 
41 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Trade Secrets: A Practitioner’s Guide § 3:9 (2d ed. 2006). 
42
 See Babirak, supra. 
43
 ConFold Pac. v. Polaris Indus., 433 F.3d 952, 959 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
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• the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the 
information; and 
• the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or 
duplicated by others.44 
The law protects trade secrets from misappropriation by others. Misappropriation is a tort that 
may occur in several distinct ways. One is when an individual acquires the trade secret through 
improper means, such as theft, bribery, misrepresentation, or espionage.45 Another is when the 
individual uses or discloses the trade secret through a breach of confidence. For example, an 
employee might switch jobs, and then disclose his previous employer’s trade secrets in violation 
of a confidentiality agreement.46 
Finally, a trade secret may be misappropriated if it is used or disclosed with knowledge that the 
trade secret had been acquired improperly or through mistake. A person who uses information 
that he knows to have been stolen by another is therefore also guilty of misappropriation.47 
Misappropriation of a trade secret may be enjoined by a court and the defendant may also be 
liable for compensatory and punitive damages.48 
Conversely, it is not a violation of trade secret law for another firm to discover the subject matter 
of a trade secret independently.49 “Reverse engineering” is also considered to be an appropriate 
means for one firm to acquire the subject matter of another ’s trade secret.50 A firm that discerns 
the subject matter of the trade secret by inspecting products available to the public also has not 
engaged in misappropriation.51 
Trade secret protection may extend indefinitely. So long as information is not generally known to 
the public, confers an economic benefit to its holder, and is subject to reasonable efforts to 
maintain its secrecy, it may be considered a trade secret.52 However, the trade secret status of 
information may be lost if the information is accidentally or intentionally disclosed by an 
employee.53 Once a trade secret has been exposed to the public, its protected character is lost and 
cannot later be retrieved.54 However, disclosures of trade secrets to third parties for certain limited 
reasons do not waive trade secret protections, so long as the trade secret owner took reasonable 
measures to maintain its secrecy before and during disclosure, such as requiring non-disclosure or 
confidentiality agreements from each recipient of confidential information.55 
44
 Restatement (First) of Torts § 757, comment b. 
45
 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40 (1994). 
46
 See Jennifer Brockett, “Protecting Intellectual Property During Layoffs,” 32 Los Angeles Lawyer (April 2009). 
47
 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40 (1994). 
48
 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 44, 45 (1994). 
49
 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 43 (1994). 
50
 See Kristin L. Black, “Crimes of Fashion: Is Imitation Truly the Sincerest Form of Flattery?,” 19 Kansas Journal of 
Law and Public Policy (2010), 515. 
51
 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 43 (1994). 
52
 Perritt, supra , at § 2:2. 
53
 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
54
 In re Remington Arms Co., 952 F.2d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 1991). 
55
 1 Roger Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 1.04. 
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Sources of Law 
The discipline of trade secrets was traditionally developed through state common law. State 
courts developed the essential principles of trade secret law through their decisions, which were 
then observed as precedent in subsequent litigation. In 1939, the American Law Institute (ALI), a 
group of lawyers, judges, and legal scholars, published a treatise titled the “Restatement of Torts.” 
The Restatement of Torts included two sections dealing with the law of trade secrets. Section 757 
explained the subject matter of trade secrets, while Section 758 spelled out the elements of a trade 
secret misappropriation cause of action. Although this treatment was succinct, many 
commentators believe that these definitions proved influential in the courts.56 
Trade secrets were not addressed in the Second Restatement of Torts published in 1978. The ALI 
at that time concluded that trade secret law had grown “no more dependent on Tort law than it is 
on many other general fields of law and upon broad statutory developments,”57 and opted not to 
house trade secrets there. The ALI addressed this gap in its 1993 Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition, which deals with trade secrets in sections 39–45. 
In addition, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) issued 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in 1979. The NCCUSL consists of a group of academics, 
attorneys, and judges who draft statutes addressing a variety of issues, and then propose that each 
state enact them.58 The NCCUSL lacks direct legislative authority itself. Its uniform acts become 
law only to the extent that state legislatures adopt them. 
The UTSA has arguably proven successful, as it has reportedly been enacted in 46 states, the 
District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands.59 The four states that have reportedly not enacted the 
UTSA are Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. These states do recognize trade 
secrets, but provide protection through a distinct statute or the common law. As attorney David S. 
Almeling reports, those four states represent 22% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product.60 
It should be appreciated that many jurisdictions have enacted the UTSA after making some 
changes to the original text of the proposed legislation. Opinions vary on how significant these 
modifications have been. While some commentators view state-by-state variations as “generally 
minor,”61 others have opined that “they include fundamental differences about what constitutes a 
trade secret, what is required to misappropriate it, and what remedies are available.”62 
56
 See Katarzyna A. Czapracka, “Antitrust and Trade Secrets: The U.S. and EU Approach,” 24 Santa Clara Computer 
High Technology Law Journal (2008), 207. 
57
 ALI, Restatements of Torts (Second), Introduction (1979). 
58
 For further information about the organization, see http://www.nccusl.org. 
59
 See David S. Almeling, “A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts,” 45 Gonzaga Law 
Review (2009-10), 291. 
60
 David S. Almeling, “Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act,” 19 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media 
& Entertainment Law Journal (2009), 769 (hereinafter Almeling, Four Reasons). 
61
 Babirak, supra, at 3. 
62
 Almeling, Four Reasons, supra, at 774. 
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The Economic Espionage Act 
As noted previously, trade secrets have traditionally been the subject of state law. Prior to 1996, 
arguably the most significant federal legislation on point was the Trade Secrets Act.63 Although 
broadly titled, this 1948 statute is actually of narrow application. It forbids federal government 
employees and government contractors from making an unauthorized disclosure of confidential 
government information, including trade secrets. The sanctions for violating this criminal offense 
are removal from office or employment, and a fine and/or imprisonment of not more than one 
year. The law does not apply to state or local government actors or to private sector employees. 
In 1996, motivated by concerns over growing international and domestic economic espionage 
against U.S. firms, Congress enacted new legislation pertaining to trade secrets. The Economic 
Espionage Act (EEA) criminalizes both “economic espionage” and the “theft of trade secrets.” 
The “economic espionage” provision punishes those who knowingly misappropriate, or attempt 
or conspire to misappropriate, trade secrets with the intent or knowledge that the offense will 
benefit a foreign government, instrumentality or agent.64 The “theft of trade secrets” prohibition is 
of more general application. The principal elements of an EEA claim for theft of trade secrets are: 
(1) the intentional and/or knowing theft, appropriation, destruction, alteration, or duplication of 
(2) a trade secret placed in interstate commerce (3) with intent to convert the trade secret and (4) 
intent or knowledge that such action will injure the owner.65 
The EEA provides for substantial fines and imprisonment penalties. For economic espionage, the 
maximum penalties increase to $500,000 for individuals and imprisonment of 15 years, or $10 
million for corporations.66 Theft of trade secrets is punishable by a fine of up to $250,000 for 
individuals as well as imprisonment of up to 10 years. Organizations can be fined up to $5 
million.67 The EEA also provides for criminal forfeiture of property and court orders preserving 
the confidentiality of trade secrets.68 
The EEA has been subject to critical commentary. Attorney R. Mark Halligan expressed the view 
that the legislation was “ineffective” and observed, in 2008, that there had been fewer than 60 
prosecutions in keeping with its provisions.69 Susan W. Brenner, a member of the law faculty of 
the University of Dayton, and security expert Anthony C. Crescenzi opine that the “paucity” of 
prosecutions under the EEA are due to a number of factors, including the complexity of the cases, 
the desire of the Department of Justice only to bring cases it can win, the diplomatic 
repercussions of bringing such a case, and the unwelcome possibility of additional disclosure of 
trade secrets during the litigation.70 Brenner and Crescenzi conclude that the “individual and 
63
 June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 79 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1905). 
64
 18 U.S.C. § 1831. 
65
 18 U.S.C. § 1832. 
66
 18 U.S.C. § 1831. 
67
 18 U.S.C. § 1832. 
68
 18 U.S.C. §§ 1834, 1835. 
69
 See Halligan, supra. 
Susan W. Brenner an 
Act,” 28 Houston Journal of International Law (2006), 389. 
70
 d Anthony C. Crescenzi, “State-Sponsored Crime: The Futility of the Economic Espionage 
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combined effect of the systemic factors discussed above is to erode the EEA’s effectiveness as a 
weapon against economic espionage.”71 
Trade Secrets and Patents 
Trade secrets and patents form two distinct fields within the U.S. intellectual property system. In 
one sense, trade secrecy serves as the chief alternative to the patent system. Most inventors must 
choose one of three options: (1) maintain a technology as a trade secret, (2) seek patent 
protection, (3) or decline to seek intellectual property protection at all and allow the technology to 
enter the public domain.72 In view of the close relationship between trade secrets and patents, this 
report next provides an overview of the patent system and its interaction with trade secret law. 
Introduction to the Patent System 
An inventor may seek the grant of a patent by preparing and submitting an application to the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, or USPTO.73 USPTO officials known as examiners then determine 
whether the invention disclosed in the application merits the award of a patent.74 The USPTO 
examiner will consider a number of legal requirements, including whether the submitted 
application fully explains and distinctly claims the invention. In particular, the application must 
enable persons skilled in the art to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. In 
addition, the application must provide the “best mode,” or preferred way, that the applicant knows 
to practice the invention.75 
The examiner will also determine whether the invention itself fulfills certain substantive 
standards set by the patent statute. To be patentable, an invention must meet four primary 
requirements. First, the invention must fall within at least one category of patentable subject 
matter.76 According to the Patent Act, an invention which is a “process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter” is eligible for patenting. Second, the invention must be useful, a 
requirement that is satisfied if the invention is operable and provides a tangible benefit.77 Third, 
the invention must be novel, or different, from subject matter disclosed by an earlier patent, 
publication, or other state-of-the-art knowledge.78 Finally, an invention is not patentable if “the 
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”79 This requirement 
of “nonobviousness” prevents the issuance of patents claiming subject matter that a skilled artisan 
would have been able to implement in view of the knowledge of the state of the art. If the USPTO 
7 1
 Id. at 439. 
72
 See generally John S. Paniaguas and Craig William Mandell, “A Practitoner’s Guide to Protecting Technology 
Assets,” 20 DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law (2010), 279. 
73
 35 U.S.C. § 111. 
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75
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allows the patent to issue, its owner obtains the right to exclude others from making, using, 
selling, offering to sell, or importing into the United States the patented invention.80 
Trade Secrets and Patents Compared 
Inventors who do not wish to dedicate their technologies to the public domain must, as a general 
matter, choose between trade secret and patent protection. A number of factors inform this 
decision. One is whether the inventor will practically be able to keep the technology secret. A 
knowledgeable observer may readily be able to inspect a motor, machine, or other mechanical 
technology in order to learn its design, for example. On the other hand, the composition of a 
chemical compound may be much more difficult to discern.81 
The costs associated with acquiring and maintaining patents are another factor. In this respect, it 
should be appreciated that a U.S. patent provides rights only with the United States. However, 
virtually anyone in the world may review a U.S. patent to learn of its contents. As a result, U.S. 
inventors may need to obtain patents in many foreign countries in order to secure meaningful 
protection. 
In addition, the process of acquiring a patent may take many years.82 A USPTO examiner in 2009 
would not review a patent application until, on average, 25.8 months after it was filed.83 The “first 
action pendency” during 2000 was 13.6 months.84 Many observers believe that if current 
conditions continue, the backlog and delay are likely to grow at the USPTO in coming years.85 
These delays may prove too lengthy for innovators in fast-moving industries, suggesting that 
trade secret protection is the more appropriate choice. 
Also, trade secrets may potentially extend indefinitely, so long as the requirements for trade secret 
protection are maintained. In contrast, patents expire after a set period of time, normally 20 years 
after the date they were filed. On the other hand, trade secret protection may be lost through a 
competitor’s reverse engineering or independent discovery. As explained by Dan Burk, a member 
of the faculty of the University of California, Irvine School of Law, “the inventor’s choice is an 
election between twenty years of certain patent protection or perpetual, but less certain, trade 
secret protection.”86 
It should also be appreciated that when an inventor obtains a patent on an invention, the USPTO 
publishes that patent in a formal document. That publication destroys the trade secret status of 
80
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81
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any previously confidential information disclosed within it.87 In addition, the USPTO publishes 
many, but not all, pending patent applications “promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 
months” after they are filed.88 This measure also destroys the trade secret status of information 
contained within the published application, even if the USPTO subsequently rejects the 
application and no patent ever issues on that invention.89 
Potential Policy Conflicts 
The trade secret and patent systems are sometimes viewed as acting in conflicting ways. Trade 
secret protection is predicated upon the maintenance of the protected information in confidence. 
In contrast, each patented invention is the subject of a formal document, the patent instrument, 
which provides a complete description of the invention. As a result, while the patent system 
appears to promote the public disclosure of new technologies, the trade secret discourages 
disclosure.90 As described previously, it could be argued that trade secret law encourages the 
development of technologies that are capable of being kept secret.91 
However, some commentators believe that patents and trade secrets generally act in a 
complementary manner.92 Mark Lemley, a member of the faculty of the Stanford Law School, has 
explained that trade secret law provides valuable incentives to innovate in areas where the patent 
law does not reach, such as customer lists and business plans.93 Lemley further explains that 
although the law requires that reasonable efforts must be made to maintain secrecy, absent trade 
secret law, firms might need to engage in even more physical and contractual measures to prevent 
disclosure. As a result, a society without trade secret law might potentially have more, rather than 
less secrecy.94 
In any event, patent law doctrine may be viewed as disfavoring trade secret holders. Well-
established patent law provides that an inventor who makes a secret, commercial use of an 
invention for more than one year prior to filing a patent application at the USPTO forfeits his own 
right to a patent.95 This policy is based principally upon the desire to maintain the integrity of the 
statutorily prescribed patent term. The patent law grants patents a term of twenty years, 
commencing from the date a patent application is filed.96 If the trade secret holder could make 
commercial use of an invention for many years before choosing to file a patent application, he 
could disrupt this regime by delaying the expiration date of his patent. 
87
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On the other hand, settled patent law principles established that prior secret uses would not defeat 
the patents of later inventors.97 If an earlier inventor made secret commercial use of an invention, 
and another person independently invented the same technology later and obtained patent 
protection, then the trade secret holder could face liability for patent infringement. This policy is 
based upon the reasoning that once issued, published patent instruments fully inform the public 
about the invention, while trade secrets do not. As between a subsequent inventor who patented 
the invention, and thus had disclosed the invention to the public, and an earlier trade secret holder 
who had not, the law favored the patent holder.98 
An example may clarify this rather complex legal situation. Suppose that Inventor X develops 
and makes commercial use of a new manufacturing process. Inventor X chooses not to obtain 
patent protection, yet maintains that process as a trade secret. Many years later, Inventor Y 
independently develops the same manufacturing process and promptly files a patent application 
claiming that invention. In such circumstances, Inventor X’s earlier, trade secret use does not 
prevent Inventor Y from procuring a patent. Furthermore, if the USPTO approves the patent 
application, then Inventor X faces infringement liability should Inventor Y file suit against him.99 
The First Inventor Defense 
Congress modified the usual rules governing the relationship between trade secrets and patents 
when it established the “first inventor defense” in the American Inventors Protection Act of 
1999.100 That statute in part provided an infringement defense for an earlier inventor of a “method 
of doing or conducting business” that was later patented by another. By limiting this defense to 
patented methods of doing business, Congress responded to the 1998 Federal Circuit opinion in 
State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group.101 That judicial opinion recognized 
that business methods could be subject to patenting, potentially exposing individuals who had 
maintained business methods as trade secrets to liability for patent infringement. 
Again, an example may aid understanding of the first inventor defense. Suppose that Inventor X 
develops and exploits commercially a new method of doing business. Inventor X maintains his 
business method as a trade secret. Many years later, Inventor Y independently develops the same 
business method and promptly files a patent application claiming that invention. Even following 
the enactment of the American Inventors Protection Act, Inventor X’s earlier, trade secret use 
would not prevent Inventor Y from procuring a patent. However, should the USPTO approve 
Inventor Y’s patent application, and should Inventor Y sue Inventor X for patent infringement, 
then Inventor X may potentially claim the benefit of the first inventor defense. If successful, 
Inventor X would enjoy a complete defense to infringement of Inventor Y’s patent. 
97
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At the time this report was published, no reported judicial opinion considers the first inventor 
defense. The most prominent judicial treatment of the first inventor defense arguably occurred in 
the 2010 Supreme Court opinion in Bilski v. Kappos.102 There, a plurality of the Supreme Court 
concluded that the American Inventors Protection Act evidenced the congressional intent that 
business methods were appropriately patented. The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens 
expressed a distinct view, stating that “that the 1999 Congress would never have enacted §273 if 
it had foreseen that this Court would rely on the provision as a basis for concluding that business 
methods are patentable.”103 
Legislation befor e the 111th Congress would modify the first inventor defense. Both H.R. 1260 
and S. 515, each titled the Patent Reform Act of 2009, would expand the first inventor defense as 
it was established in 1999. The defense currently applies to “the person who performed the acts 
necessary to establish the defense....” Both bills would also allow “any other entity that controls, 
is controlled by, or is under common control” with that person to claim entitlement to the first 
inventor defense.104 A third bill titled the Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, does not address the 
first inventor defense. 
Congressional Issues and Options 
A variety of options are available for Congress with respect to trade secrets. If the current 
situation is deemed appropriate, then no action need be taken. Alternatively, Congress may wish 
to consider the adoption of a federal trade secret law. Several commentators believe that this step 
would promote the uniformity of trade secret law throughout the United States.105 As attorney 
David S. Almeling asserts: 
Trade secrets stand alone as the only major type of intellectual property governed primarily 
by state law. Trademarks, copyrights, and patents are each governed primarily by federal 
statutes. Trade secrets, by contrast, are governed by fifty state statutes and common laws. 
The result is that trade secret law differs from state to state. It is time to eliminate these 
differences—and the significant problems they cause—by enacting a Federal Trade Secrets 
Act (“FTSA”).106 
According to Alemeling, general federal trade secret legislation would establish greater 
uniformity in substantive and procedural law than is possible in a state-based regime. 
Other commentators have further suggested that the current state-based trade secrets system 
places the United States in violation of its obligations under two international agreements: the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement).107 Both NAFTA and the 
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TRIPS Agreement require member states to provide certain levels of trade secret protection. 
Because the portions of NAFTA and the TRIPS Agreement concerning trade secrets were 
modeled after the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), those states that have adopted the UTSA 
without restrictive modifications likely comply with these international standards. But some states 
have not adopted the UTSA, and some states that have done so have arguably included more 
restrictive standards. Some commentators have asserted that these states place the United States 
in violation of NAFTA and the TRIPS Agreement. However, others have observed that any 
shortcomings of U.S. law on this point have yet to be challenged under either international 
agreement.108 
Still other observers assert that no compelling case has been made to federalize trade secret law. 
Some believe that this step might create additional burdens and costs upon the federal judiciary.109 
Others cite federalism concerns, believing that the states possess a strong interest in regulating 
local economies in view of their own, local norms.110 In addition, variation between the laws of 
the different states does not necessarily compel federalization of the field. For example, 
meaningful distinctions between the states exist in other areas of law, including such fundamental 
disciplines as contract law. Yet these disciplines remain subject to state law.111 
A second possibility for Congress is to amend the Economic Espionage Act. Varying 
commentators have described the EEA as “seldom enforced,”112 “futile,”113 and of “limited” value 
as a deterrent.114 Reforms have been proposed to address these perceived deficiencies. Attorney 
R. Mark Halligan has asserted that the EEA, which is currently limited to criminal prosecution, 
should include a civil cause of action. According to Halligan, enacting a federal civil cause of 
action to protect trade secrets would deter the theft of trade secrets and act to the advantage of 
U.S. firms domestically and abroad.115 Halligan does not propose wholly federalizing trade secret 
law—under his proposal, trade secret law would remain primarily a matter of state law. Still, 
some of the concerns voiced in that context, including burdening the federal judiciary and 
decreasing state sovereignty, could potentially arise here as well. 
In addition, Congress may wish to remain apprised of the potential effect of current patent reform 
efforts upon trade secrets.116 As this report has discussed, trade secrets and patents act in 
complementary ways to protect innovation in the United States.117 Further, to some degree the 
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two forms of intellectual property act as imperfect substitutes for each other. As a result, 
legislative reforms that are perceived to make patents more effective may reduce industrial 
reliance upon trade secrets. Conversely, amendments to the Patent Act that are believed to reduce 
the effectiveness of patents may increase the willingness of firms to retain information as trade 
secrets.118 
Concluding Observations 
Trade secrets form a significant component of the intellectual property system of the United 
States. The importance of trade secrets will likely increase as U.S. industry continues to 
participate within a knowledge-based, global economy with increasingly sophisticated 
competitors. Because trade secrets are currently a matter of state law, congressional influence 
over the system has thus far been indirect: Through the enactment of a criminal statute, the 
Economic Espionage Act, and through amendment to the patent law. Whether further intervention 
is required in the U.S. trade secret system remains a matter of congressional judgment. 
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